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Abstract
Word puzzles and the problem of their representations in logic languages have received considerable at-
tention in the last decade (Ponnuru et al. 2004; Shapiro 2011; Baral and Dzifcak 2012; Schwitter 2013). Of
special interest is the problem of generating such representations directly from natural language (NL) or
controlled natural language (CNL). An interesting variation of this problem, and to the best of our knowl-
edge, scarcely explored variation in this context, is when the input information is inconsistent. In such
situations, the existing encodings of word puzzles produce inconsistent representations and break down.
In this paper, we bring the well-known type of paraconsistent logics, called Annotated Predicate Calculus
(APC) (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992), to bear on the problem. We introduce a new kind of non-monotonic se-
mantics for APC, called consistency preferred stable models and argue that it makes APC into a suitable
platform for dealing with inconsistency in word puzzles and, more generally, in NL sentences. We also
devise a number of general principles to help the user choose among the different representations of NL
sentences, which might seem equivalent but, in fact, behave differently when inconsistent information is
taken into account. These principles can be incorporated into existing CNL translators, such as Attempto
Controlled English (ACE) (Fuchs et al. 2008) and PENG Light (White and Schwitter 2009). Finally, we
show that APC with the consistency preferred stable model semantics can be equivalently embedded in
ASP with preferences over stable models, and we use this embedding to implement this version of APC in
Clingo (Gebser et al. 2011) and its Asprin add-on (Brewka et al. 2015).
To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).
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1 Introduction
The problem of logical representation for word puzzles has recently received considerable at-
tention (Ponnuru et al. 2004; Shapiro 2011; Baral and Dzifcak 2012; Schwitter 2013). In all of
these studies, however, the input information is assumed to be consistent and the proposed log-
ical representations break on inconsistent input. The present paper proposes an approach that
works in the presence of inconsistency and not just for word puzzles.
At first sight, one might think that the mere use of a paraconsistent logic such as Belanp’s four
valued logic (Belnap Jr 1977) or Annotated Logic Programming (Blair and Subrahmanian 1989;
Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992) is all what is needed to address the problem, but it is not so. We
do start with a well-known paraconsistent logic, called Annotated Predicate Calculus (APC)
(Kifer and Lozinskii 1992), which is related to the aforementioned Annotated Logic Programs,
but this is not enough: a number of issues arise in the presence of paraconsistency and different
translations might seem equivalent but behave differently when inconsistent information is taken
into account. As it turns out, several factors can affect the choice of the “right” logical repre-
sentation for many NL sentences, especially for implications. We formalize several principles to
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guide the translation of NL sentences into APC, principles that can be incorporated into existing
controlled language translators, such as Attempto Controlled English (ACE) (Fuchs et al. 2008)
and PENG Light (White and Schwitter 2009). We illustrate these issues with the classical Jobs
Puzzle (Wos et al. 1984) and show how inconsistent information affects the conclusions.
To address the above problems formally, we introduce a new kind of non-monotonic semantics
for APC, which is based on consistency-preferred stable models and is inspired by the concept of
the most epistemically-consistent models of (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992). We argue that this new
semantics makes APC into a good platform for dealing with inconsistency in word puzzles and,
more generally, for translating natural language sentences into logic.
Finally, we show that the consistency-preferred stable models of APC can be computed using
answer-set programming (ASP) systems that support preferences over stable models, such as
Clingo (Gebser et al. 2011) with the Asprin add-on (Brewka et al. 2015).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background material on APC. In Sec-
tion 3 we consider the logic programming subset of APC and define preferential stable models
for it. In Section 4, we show that the logic programming subset of APC (under the consistency-
preferred stable model semantics) can be encoded in ASP in semantically-preserving way. In
Section 5, we discuss variations of Jobs Puzzle (Wos et al. 1984) when various kinds of incon-
sistency are injected into the formulation of the puzzle. Section 6 explains that logical encoding
of common knowledge in the presence of inconsistency needs to take into account a number
of considerations that are not present when inconsistency is not an issue. We organize those
considerations into several different principles and illustrate their impact. Section 8 concludes
the paper. Finally, Appendix A contains the full encoding of Jobs Puzzle in APC under the
consistency-preferred semantics. This appendix also includes variations that inject various kinds
of inconsistency into the puzzle, and the derived conclusions are discussed. Appendices B and
C contain similar analyses of other well-known puzzles: Zebra Puzzle1 and Marathon Puzzle
(C. Guéret and Sevaux 2000). Ready-to-run encodings of these programs in Clingo/Asprin can
be found at https://bitbucket.org/tiantiangao/apc_lp.
2 Annotated Predicate Calculus: Background and Extensions
To make this paper self-contained, this section provides the necessary background on APC. At
the end of the section, we define new semantic concepts for APC, which will be employed in
later sections.
The alphabet of APC consists of countably-infinite sets of: variables V , function symbols F
(each symbol having an arity; constants are viewed as 0-ary function symbols), predicate symbols
P , truth annotations, quantifiers, and logical connectives. In (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992), truth
annotations could come from an arbitrary upper semilattice (called “belief semilattice” there),
but here we will use only ⊥ (unknown), f (false), t (true) and ⊤ (contradiction or inconsistency),
which are partially ordered as follows: ⊥≤ f≤⊤ and ⊥≤ t≤⊤. Terms in APC are constructed
exactly as in predicate calculus: from constants, variables and function symbols. A ground term
is one that has no variables.
Definition 1 (Atomic formulas (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992)). A predicate term has the form
p(t1, t2, . . . , tn), where p is a n-ary predicate symbol and t1, t2, . . . , tn are terms. An APC atomic
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zebra_Puzzle
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formula (or an APC predicate) has the form p(t1, t2, . . . , tn) : s, where p(t1, t2, . . . , tn) is a predicate
term and s is annotation indicating the degree of belief (or truth) in the predicate term. A ground
atomic formula is an atomic formula that has no variables.
We call an atomic formula of the form p : s a t-predicate (resp., an f-, ⊤-, or ⊥-predicate) if s
is t (resp., f-, ⊤-, or ⊥).
APC includes the usual universal and existential quantifiers, the connectives, ∧ and ∨, and
there are two negation and two implication connectives: the ontological negation ¬ and ontolog-
ical implication←, plus the epistemic negation∼ and epistemic implication <∼. As will be seen
later, the distinction between the ontological and the epistemic connectives is useful because they
behave differently in the presence of inconsistency.
Definition 2 (APC well-formed formulas (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992)). An APC well-formed
formula is defined inductively as follows:
– an atomic formula p(t1, t2, . . . , tn) : s
– if φ and ψ are well-formed formulas, then so are ∼ φ , ¬φ , φ ∧ψ , φ ∨ψ , φ ← ψ , and
φ <∼ ψ .
– if φ is a formula and X is a variable, then (∀Xφ ) and (∃Xφ ) are formulas.
An APC literal is either a predicate p : s or an ontologically negated predicate ¬p : s. An
epistemic literal is either a predicate p : s or an epistemically negated predicate ∼ p : s.
In (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992), the semantics was defined with respect to general models, but
here we will be dealing with logic programs and the Herbrand semantics will be more handy.
Definition 3 (APC Herbrand universe, base, and interpretations). The Herbrand universe U
for APC is the set of all ground terms. The Herbrand base B for APC is the set of all ground APC
atomic formulas. An Herbrand interpretation I for APC is a non-empty subset of the Herbrand
base that is closed with respect to the following operations:
– if p : s ∈ I, then also p : s′ ∈ I for all s′ ≤ s; and
– if p : s1, p : s2 ∈ I, and s = lub≤(s1,s2) then p : s ∈ I.
The annotations used in APC form a lattice (in our case a 4-element lattice) with the order≤ and
with lub≤ used as the least upper bound operator of that lattice.
We will also use B⊤ to denote the subset of all ⊤-predicates in B.
As usual, a variable assignment is a mapping ν : V → U that takes a variable and returns
a ground term. This mapping is extended to terms as follows: ν( f (t1, . . . , tn)) = f (ν(t1), . . . ,
ν(tn)). We will disregard variable assignments for formulas with no free variables (called sen-
tences) since they do not affect ground formulas.
Definition 4 (APC Herbrand Models). Let I be an APC Herbrand interpretation and ν be a
variable assignment. For an atomic formula p(t1, t2, . . . , tn) : s, we write I |=ν p(t1, t2, . . . , tn) : s if
and only if p(ν(t1),ν(t2), . . . ,ν(tn)) : s ∈ I. For well-formed formulas φ and ψ , we write:
– I |=ν φ ∧ψ if and only if I |=ν φ and I |=ν ψ ;
– I |=ν φ ∨ψ if and only if I |=ν φ or I |=ν ψ ;
– I |=ν ¬φ if and only if not I |=ν φ ;
– I |=ν (∀X)φ if and only if I |=ν ′ φ , for every assignment ν ′ that differs from ν only in its
X-value;
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– I |=ν (∃X)φ if and only if I |=ν ′ φ , for some ν ′ that differs from ν only in its X-value;
– I |=ν ψ ← φ if and only if I |=ν ¬φ ∨ψ ;
– I |=ν∼ p : s if and only if I |=ν p :∼ s, where∼ t = f, ∼ f = t, ∼⊤ = ⊤ and ∼⊥= ⊥;
We also define: ∼ ¬φ ≡ ¬ ∼ φ , ∼ (φ ∧ ψ) ≡∼ φ∨ ∼ ψ , ∼ (φ ∨ ψ) ≡∼ φ∧ ∼ ψ ,
∼ ∀Xφ ≡ ∃X ∼ φ , ∼ ∃Xφ ≡ ∀X ∼ φ , and ψ <∼ φ ≡∼ φ ∨ψ .
A formula φ is satisfied by I if and only if I |=ν φ for every valuation ν . In this case we write
simply I |= φ . I is a model of a set of formulas P if and only if every formula φ ∈ P is satisfied in
I. A set of formulas P logically entails a formula ψ , denoted P |= ψ , if and only if every model
of P is also a model of ψ .
APC has two types of logical entailment: ontological and epistemic. Ontological entailment
is the entailment |=, which we have just defined. Before defining the epistemic entailment, we
motivate it with a number of examples. To avoid clutter, in all examples we will only show the
highest annotation for each APC predicate. For instance, if a model contains p :⊤, then we will
not show p : t, p : f, or p :⊥.
Example 1. Consider the following set of APC formulas P = {q : t ← p : t, p : t}. It has four
models: m1 = {p : t, q : t}, m2 = {p :⊤, q : t}, m3 = {p : t, q :⊤} and m4 = {p :⊤, q :⊤}.
Thus, P |= q : t holds (since q : t occurs in every model of P).
Example 2. The APC set of formulas P = {q : t ← p : t, p : ⊤} has two models: m1 = {p :
⊤, q : t} and m2 = {p :⊤, q :⊤}. Therefore, P |= q : t holds.
Example 3. This set of formulas P = {q : t <∼ p : t, p : t} is similar to that in Example 1
except that it uses epistemic implication instead of the ontological one. One of the models of that
set is m = {p :⊤, q :⊥} and therefore P 6|= q : t.
Examples 1 and 2 show that ontological implication has the modus ponens property, but it
may be too strong, as it allows one to draw conclusions from inconsistent information. Epistemic
implication of Example 3, on the other hand, is too cautious and does not have the modus ponens
property. However, epistemic implication does have the modus ponens property and it blocks
drawing conclusions from inconsistency under the epistemic entailment, defined next.
Definition 5 (Most e-consistent models (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992)). A Herbrand interpreta-
tion I1 is more (or equally) e-consistent than another interpretation I2 (denoted I1 ≤⊤ I2) if and
only if I1 |= p :⊤ implies I2 |= p :⊤ for every ground predicate term p.
A model I of a set of formulas P is a most e-consistent model, if there is no other model of P
that is strictly more e-consistent than I.
A program P epistemically entails a formula ψ , denoted P|≈ ψ , if and only if every most
e-consistent model of P is also a model of ψ .
Going back to Example 3, it has only one most e-consistent model m= {p : t,q : t}, so P|≈ q : t
holds. The next example shows that <∼ does not propagate inconsistency to conclusions.
Example 4. Let P = {q : t <∼ p : t, p : ⊤}. Observe that P has a most e-consistent model
m = {p :⊤, q :⊥}, in which q : t does not hold. Therefore, P|6≈ q : t holds.
Next we observe that not all inconsistent information is created equal, as people have different
degrees of confidence in different pieces of information. For instance, one normally would have
higher confidence in the fact that someone named Robin is a person than in the fact that Robin is
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a male. Therefore, given a choice, we would hold it less likely that person(robin) is inconsistent
than that male(robin) is. Likewise, in the following example, given a choice, we are more likely
to hold to a belief that Pete is a person than to a belief that he is rich.
Example 5. Consider the following formulas
person(pete) : t.
businessman(pete) : t.
rich(pete) : f.
rich(X) : t <∼ person(X) : t ∧ businessman(X) : t.
There are three most e-consistent models:
m1 = {person(pete) :⊤, businessman(pete) : t, rich(pete) : f}
m2 = {person(pete) : t, businessman(pete) :⊤, rich(pete) : f}
m3 = {person(pete) : t, businessman(pete) : t, rich(pete) :⊤}
Based on the aforesaid confidence considerations, we are more likely to believe that Pete is a
person than that he is a businessman or rich. Therefore, we are likely to think that the models m2
and m3 are better descriptions of the real world than m1.
In this paper, we capture the above intuition by extending the notion of most e-consistent
models with additional preferences over models.
Definition 6 (Consistency-preference relation and consistency-preferred models). A con-
sistency preference S over interpretations, where S is a set of ground ⊤-predicates in APC, is
defined as follows:
– An interpretation I1 is consistency-preferred over I2 with respect to S, denoted I1 <S I2, if
and only if S∩ I1 ⊂ S∩ I2.
– Interpretation I1 and I2 are consistency-equal with respect to S, denoted I1 =S I2, if and
only if S∩ I1 = S∩ I2.
A consistency-preference relation <S , where S = (S1,S2, . . . ,Sn) is a sequence of sets of
ground ⊤-predicates, is defined as a lexicographic order composed out of the sequence of con-
sistency preferences S1,S2, . . . ,Sn. Namely, I1 <S I2 if and only iff there is 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
(
∧
1≤ j<i(I1 =S j I2)) and I1 <Si I2.
A model I of a set of formulas P is called (most) consistency-preferred with respect to <S if
P has no other model J such that J <S I.
We will always assume that Sn = B⊤ — the set of all ground⊤-predicates and, therefore, any
most consistency-preferred model is also a most e-consistent one.
We use the notation |≈S to denote epistemic entailment with respect to most consistency-
preferred models. A program P epistemically entails a formula ψ with respect to a consistency-
preference relation <S , denoted P|≈S ψ , if and only if every most consistency-preferred model
of P is also a model of ψ .
3 Logic Programming Subset of APC and Its Stable Models Semantics
In this section, we define the logic programming subset of APC, denoted APCLP, and give it a
new kind of semantics based on consistency-preferred stable models.
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Definition 7. An APCLP program consists of rules of the form:
l0∨·· ·∨ lm ← lm+1∧·· ·∧ ln∧¬ ln+1∧·· ·∧¬ lk.
where each li is an epistemic literal. Variables are assumed to be implicitly universally quantified.
An APCLP formula is either a singleton epistemic literal, or a conjunction of epistemic literals,
or a disjunction of them.
The formula l0∨·· · ∨ lm is called the head of the rule, and lm+1∧·· · ∧ ln ∧¬ ln+1∧·· · ∧¬ lk
is the body of that rule.
Recall from Section 2 that epistemic negation can be pushed inside and eliminated via this
law: ∼ p : α ≡ p :∼ α , where ∼ t = f, ∼ f = t, ∼ ⊤ = ⊤, and ∼⊥ = ⊥ so, for brevity,
we assume that all APCLP programs are transformed in this way and the epistemic negation is
eliminated.
When the rule body is empty, the ontological implication symbol← is usually omitted and the
rule becomes a disjunction. Such a disjunction can also be represented as an epistemic implica-
tion and sometimes this representation may be closer to a normal English sentence. For instance,
the sentence, “If a person is a businessman then that person is rich,” can be represented as an
epistemic implication: rich(X) : t <∼ person(X) : t ∧ businessman(X) : t, which is easier to
read than the equivalent disjunction rich(X) : t ∨ person(X) : f ∨ businessman(X) : f.
The notion of stable models for APCLP carries over from standard answer set programming
(ASP) with very few changes.
Definition 8 (The Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct for APCLP). Let P be an APCLP program and M be
a Herbrand interpretation. The reduct of P w.r.t. M, denoted PM , is a program free from ontological
negation obtained by
1. removing rules with ¬p : s in the body, where M |= p : s; and
2. removing literals ¬p : s from all remaining rules.
Definition 9 (Stable models for APCLP). A Herbrand interpretation M is a stable model of
an APCLP program P if M is a minimal model of PM . Here, minimality is with respect to set
inclusion.
Definition 10 (Consistency-preferred stable models for APCLP). Let <S be a consistency-
preference relation of Definition 6, where S = (S1,S2, . . . ,Sn) is a sequence of sets of ground
⊤-predicates. An APCLP interpretation M is a (most) consistency-preferred stable model of an
APCLP program P if and only if:
– M is a stable model of P, and
– M is a most consistency-preferred model with respect to <S .
4 Embedding APCLP into ASP
We now show that APCLP can be isomorphically embedded in ASP extended with a model
preference framework, such as the Clingo system (Gebser et al. 2011) with its Asprin extension
(Brewka et al. 2015). We then prove the correctness of this embedding, i.e., that it is one-to-one
and preserves the semantics. Next, we define the subset of ASP onto which APCLP maps.
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Definition 11. ASPtruth is a subset of ASP programs where the only predicate is truth/2, which
is used to reify the APC predicate terms and associate them with truth values. That is, these
atoms have the form truth(p,s), where the first argument is the reification of an APC predicate
term and the second argument is one of these truth annotations: t, f, top, or bottom.
An ASPtruth program consists a set of rules of the form:
t0∨·· ·∨ tm ← tm+1∧·· ·∧ tn∧not tn+1∧·· ·∧not tk.
where the ti’s are truth/2-predicates.
An ASPtruth formula is either a singleton truth/2-predicate, a conjunction of such predicates,
or a disjunction of them.
Definition 12. The embedding of an APCLP program in ASPtruth, denoted Ξasp, is defined recur-
sively as follows (where tvasp is the truth value mapping):
– tvasp(t) = t
– tvasp(f) = f
– tvasp(⊤) = top
– tvasp(⊥) = bottom
– Ξasp(p : s) = truth(p,tvasp(s))
– Ξasp(¬L) = not Ξasp(L), where L is an APC predicate
– Ξasp(L∨φ) = Ξasp(L)∨Ξasp(φ), where L is an APC predicate and φ is a disjunction of
APC predicates
– Ξasp(L∧φ) = Ξasp(L)∧Ξasp(φ), where L is an APC literal and φ is a conjunction of
APC literals
– Ξasp(head ← body) = Ξasp(head)← Ξasp(body), where head (resp., body) denotes the
head (resp., the body) of a rule.
The embedding Ξasp also applies to APC Herbrand interpretations: each APC Herbrand inter-
pretation (which is a set of APC atoms of the form p : s) is mapped to a set of ASPtruth atoms (of
the form truth(p,tvasp(s)) ).
We require that each ASPtruth program includes the following background axioms to match the
semantics of APC:
truth(X,top) :- truth(X,t),truth(X,f).
truth(X,t) :- truth(X,top).
truth(X,f) :- truth(X,top).
truth(X,bottom).
Lemma 1. The embedding Ξasp : APCLP → ASPtruth is a one-to-one correspondence.
Proof. As mentioned, we can limit our attention to ∼-free programs. First, it is obvious that
Ξasp is injective on APC literals. Injectivity on APC conjunctions and disjunctions can be shown
by a straightforward induction on the number of conjuncts and disjuncts. Surjectivity follows
similarly because it is straightforward to define the inverse of Ξasp by reversing the equations of
Definition 12.
Next, we show the above APC-to-ASP embedding preserves models, Gelfond-Lifshitz reduct,
stable models, and also consistency preference relations.
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Lemma 2. The models of any ASPtruth program are closed with respect to lub≤ and downward-
closed with respect to the ≤-ordering. Also, I is a model of an APCLP program P if and only if
Ξasp(I) is a model of Ξasp(P).
Proof. Recall that every APCtruth is required to have the four rules listed right after Definition 12.
These rules obviously enforce the requisite closures. The second part of the lemma follows di-
rectly from the definitions.
Lemma 3. Ξasp preserves the Gelfond-Lifshitz reduct: Ξasp(PI ) = Ξasp(P)Ξasp(I) .
Proof. For every predicate p : s ∈ P, we have I |= p : s if and only if Ξasp(I) |= truth(p,s), by
Lemma 2. By the same lemma, if r ∈ P then I |= p : s where ¬p : s ∈ body(r) if and only if
Ξasp(I) |= truth(p,s), where not truth(p,s) ∈ body(Ξasp(r)). As a result, rule r gets eliminated
by Gelfond-Lifschitz reduction if and only if Ξasp(r) is eliminated and a negative literal in the
body of r gets dropped if and only if its image in Ξasp(r) gets dropped.
Lemma 4. Let I be a APC Herbrand interpretation. J is an APC Herbrand model of PI if and
only if Ξasp(J) is a model of Ξasp(PI ).
Proof. If r ∈P is a rule then J |= head(r) if and only if Ξasp(J) |= head(Ξasp(r)) and J 6|= body(r)
if and only if Ξasp(J) 6|= body(Ξasp(r)). Thus, J |= r if and only if Ξasp(J) |= Ξasp(r).
Lemma 5. Let I1 and I2 be APC Herbrand interpretations. I1 ⊆ I2 if and only if Ξasp(I1) ⊆
Ξasp(I2).
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of Ξapc and its inverse.
Theorem 6. M is a stable model of an APCLP program P if and only if Ξasp(M) is a stable
model of Ξasp(P).
Proof. By Lemma 4, J is a model of PM if and only if Ξasp(J) is a model of
Ξasp(P)
Ξasp(M) . Thus, the set
of models for PM is in a one-one correspondence with the set of models for
Ξasp(P)
Ξasp(M) . By Lemma 5,
this correspondence preserves set-inclusion, so the set of minimal models of PM stands in one-one
correspondence with respect to Ξasp with the set of minimal models of Ξasp(P)Ξasp(M) .
A consistency preference relation <S , where S = (S1,S2, . . . ,Sn), is translated into the fol-
lowing Asprin (Brewka et al. 2015) lexico preference relation A along with several subset pref-
erences relations, each corresponding to one of the <Si that are part of <S (see Definition 6).
#preference(A , lexico){ 1::name( s1 ); 2::name( s2 ); . . .; n::name( sn )}.
#preference( s1 , subset){ the list of elements in Ξasp(S1) }.
. . .
#preference( sn , subset){ the list of elements in Ξasp(Sn) }.
Lemma 7. Let I1 and I2 be APC Herbrand interpretations, S = (S1,S2, . . . ,Sn) be a consistency
preference relation and A be its corresponding Asprin preference relation. I1 <S I2 if and only
if Ξasp(I1) is preferred over Ξasp(I2) with respect to A .
Proof. The definition in the Asprin manual of the Asprin lexico and subset preference relations,
as applied to our preference statements A given just prior to Lemma 7, is just a paraphrase of
the lexicographical consistency-preference relation S in Definition 6. The lemma now follows
from the obvious fact that Ξasp maps ⊤-literals of ASP onto the top-literals of ASPtruth, which
have the form truth(p,top).
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Theorem 8. M is a most consistency pre f erred stable model of an APCLP program P with
respect to a consistency preference relation <S (where S = (S1,S2, . . . ,Sn)) if and only if
Ξasp(M) is a preferred model of Ξasp(P) with respect to the corresponding Asprin preference
relation A .
Proof. By Lemma 4, J is a model of PM if and only if Ξasp(J) is a model of Ξasp(P)Ξasp(M) . Since, by
Lemma 7, Ξasp maps the preference relation S over the APC models into the preference relation
A over the ASP models, the result follows.
5 Jobs Puzzle and Inconsistency
Jobs Puzzle (Wos et al. 1984) is a classical logical puzzle that became a benchmark of sorts for
many automatic theorem provers (Shapiro 2011; Schwitter 2013); it is also included in TPTP.2
The usual description of Jobs Puzzle does not include implicit knowledge, like the facts that a
person is either a male or a female (but not both), the husband of a person must be unique, etc.,
so we add this knowledge explicitly, like (Schwitter 2013). We also changed the name Steve to
Robin in order to better illustrate one form of inconsistency.
1. There are four people: Roberta, Thelma, Robin and Pete.
2. Among them, they hold eight different jobs.
3. Each holds exactly two jobs.
4. The jobs are: chef, guard, nurse, telephone operator, police officer (gender not implied),
teacher, actor, and boxer.
5. The job of nurse is held by a male.
6. The husband of the chef is the telephone operator.
7. Roberta is not a boxer.
8. Pete has no education past the ninth grade.
9. Roberta, the chef, and the police officer went golfing together.
In sum there are four people and eight jobs and to solve the puzzle one must figure out who
holds which jobs. The solution is that Thelma is a chef and a boxer (and is married to Pete). Pete
is a telephone operator and an actor. Roberta is a teacher and a guard. Finally, Robin is a police
officer and a nurse.
However, if we inject inconsistency into the puzzle, current logical approaches fail because
they are based on logics that do not tolerate inconsistency. Consider the following examples.
Example 6. Let us add to the puzzle that “Thelma is an actor.” Given that the original puz-
zle implies that Thelma is not an actor (she was a chef and a boxer), this addition causes in-
consistencies. A first-order encoding of the puzzle (as, say, in TPTP) or an ASP-based one in
(Schwitter 2013) will not find any models. In contrast, an encoding in APCLP can isolate in-
consistent information. There are two possibilities: one where Thelma is an actor and the other
where Thelma is a female. If we add background knowledge that Thelma is a female’s name, it
is less likely that Thelma’s gender will be inconsistent, so the only consistency-preferred model
will have one inconsistent conclusion that Thelma is an actor, but all other true facts will remain
consistent.
2 Thousands of Problems for Theorem Provers (http://www.cs.miami.edu/~tptp/).
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Example 7. Consider adding the sentences “Robin is a male name” and “Robin is a female
name,” which will imply that Robin is both a male and female. The first-order and ASP-based
encodings will, again, find no models, while an APCLP-based encoding will localize inconsis-
tency to just male(robin) :⊤ and female(robin) :⊤.
Example 8. Consider adding the sentence “Robin is Thelma’s husband.” Since the original
job puzzle implies that Pete is Thelma’s husband, this will cause inconsistency. If we add the
background knowledge that husband is unique, again, the encoding of this modified puzzle in
ACPLP will localize inconsistency to just the aforesaid husband-facts.
6 Knowledge Representation Principles for Inconsistency
Mere encoding of Jobs Puzzle in APCLP is not enough because it is not unique: when inconsis-
tency is taken into account, more information needs to be provided to obtain the encodings that
match user intent. The main problem is that, if inconsistency is allowed, the number of possible
worlds can grow to many hundreds even in relatively simple scenarios like Jobs Puzzle, and this
practically annuls the benefits of the switch to a paraconsistent logic. We have already seen small
examples of such scenarios at the end of Section 2, which motivated our notion of consistency
preference, but there are more. We organize these scenarios around six main principles.
Principle 1: Contrapositive inference
Like in classical logic, contrapositive inference may be useful for knowledge representation.
Consider the following sentences:
If someone is a nurse, then that someone is educated.
Pete is not educated.
We could encode the first sentence as educated(X) : t ← nurse(X) : t or as educated(X) : t <∼
nurse(X) : t. Classically, the above sentences imply that Pete is not a nurse, but the encoding of
the first sentence using the ontological implication ← would not allow for that. If contrapositive
inference is required, epistemic implication should be used.
Example 9. Consider P = {educated(X) : t <∼ nurse(X) : t, ∼ educated(pete) : t}. It has
only one most consistency preferred model with respect to <S (with S = (B⊤)), namely m =
{educated(pete) : f, nurse(pete) : f}. Therefore, P|≈S nurse(pete) : f holds.
The above example uses contrapositive inference, but this is not always desirable. For instance,
suppose P′ = {male(X) : t← nurse(X) : t, ∼ male(robin) : t}. Here we use ontological impli-
cation to block contrapositive inference. Observe that P′ has a most consistency preferred model
with respect to <S , namely m = {male(robin) : f, nurse(robin) :⊥}. Therefore, nurse(robin) : f
does not hold, and this is exactly what we want, even if Robin happens to be not a male.3
Principle 2: Propagation of inconsistency
As discussed in Example 2, APC gives us a choice of whether to draw conclusions from
inconsistent information or not, and it is a useful choice. One way to block such inferences,
illustrated in that example, is to use epistemic implication. Another way is to use the ontological
implication with the t+¬⊤ pattern in the rule body, e.g.,
educated(X) : t ← nurse(X) : t ∧ ¬nurse(X) :⊤.
3 In the USA as opposed to the U.K.
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Both techniques block inferences from inconsistent information, but the second also blocks in-
ference by contraposition, as discussed in Principle 1. The following examples illustrate the use
of both of these methods.
Example 10. Let P = {educated(X) : t <∼ nurse(X) : t, nurse(pete) : ⊤}. Observe that there
is one most consistency preferred model with respect to <S (as before, S = (B⊤)): m =
{educated(pete) :⊥, nurse(pete) :⊤}. Therefore, P|6≈S educated(pete) : t.
Example 11. Let P = {educated(X) : t ← nurse(X) : t∧¬nurse(X) : ⊤, nurse(pete) : ⊤}.
As in the previous example, P has a most consistency preferred model m = {nurse(pete) :
⊤, educated(pete) :⊥} and so P |6≈S educated(pete) : t.
In both of these examples, inconsistency is not propagated through the rules, but Example 10
allows for contrapositive inference, while Example 11 does not. Indeed, suppose that instead
of nurse(pete) : ⊤ we had educated(pete) : f. Then, in the first case, nurse(pete) : f would be
derived, while in the second it would not.
Blocking contrapositive inference and non-propagation of inconsistency can be applied selec-
tively to some literals but not the others.
Example 12. Consider the following sentence, “if a person holds a job of nurse then that person
is educated”. It can be encoded as
(educated(X) : t <∼ nurse(X) : t) ← person(X) : t.
The rule allows propagation of inconsistency through the person-predicate but blocks such prop-
agation for the nurse-predicate. It also inhibits contrapositive inference of person(pete) : f if the
head of the rule is falsified by the additional facts nurse(pete) : t and educated(pete) : f. How-
ever, due to the head of the rule, contrapositive inference would be allowed for nurse(pete) : f if
educated(pete) : f was given.
Principle 3: Polarity
This principle addresses situations such as the sentence “A person must be either a male or
a female, but not both”. When inconsistency is possible, we want to say three things: that any
person must be either a male and or a female, that these facts cannot be unknown, and that if one
of these is inconsistent then the other is too.
Example 13. Let P be:
male(X) : t ∨ female(X) : t ← person(X) : t
male(X) : f ∨ female(X) : f ← person(X) : t
male(X) :⊤ ← person(X) : t ∧ female(X) :⊤
female(X) :⊤ ← person(X) : t ∧ male(X) :⊤
person(robin) : t
Two most consistency preferred models exist, which minimize the inconsistency of person(robin):
m1 = {person(robin) : t, male(robin) : t, female(robin) : f}, and
m2 = {person(robin) : t, male(robin) : f, female(robin) : t}.
If we add male(robin) :⊤ (or female(robin) :⊤) to P, then only one most consistency preferred
model remains: m = {male(robin) :⊤, female(robin) :⊤, person(robin) : t}.
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Conditional polarity (or polar dependency) is generally represented as follows
p : t ; q : t← condition.
p : f ; q : f← condition.
q :⊤← condition∧ p :⊤.
p :⊤← condition∧q :⊤.
where condition is a conjunction of atomic formulas and p, q are polar facts with respect to that
condition.
Principle 4: Consistency preference relations
Recall from Example 5 that inconsistent information is not created equal, as people have dif-
ferent degrees of confidence in different pieces of information. For example, we have more con-
fidence that someone whom we barely know is a person compared to the information about
this person’s marital situation (e.g., whether a husband exists). Therefore, person-facts are more
likely to be consistent than marriage-facts and so we need to define consistency preference re-
lations to specify the degrees of confidence. Consistency preference relations were introduced
in Definition 6, and we already had numerous examples of its use. In Jobs Puzzle encoding in
Appendix A, we use one, fairly elaborate, consistency preference relation. It first sets person
and job information to be of the highest degree of confidence. Then, it prefers consistency of
gender information of everybody but Robin. Third, it prefers consistency of the job assignment
information. And finally, it minimizes inconsistency in general, for all facts.
Principle 5: Complete knowledge
This principle stipulates that certain information is defined completely, and cannot be unknown
(⊥). But it can be inconsistent. Moreover, similarly to closed world assumption, negative infor-
mation is preferred. For instance, if we do not know that someone is someone’s husband, we may
assume that that person is not. Such conclusions can be specified via a rule like this:
husband(X ,Y) : f ← person(X) : t ∧ person(Y ) : t ∧ ¬husband(X ,Y) : t
Note that, unlike, say ASP, jumping to negative conclusions is not ensured by the stable model se-
mantics of APC and must be given explicitly. But the advantage is that it can be done selectively.
More generally, this type of reasoning can be specified as
p : f ← condition ∧ ¬p : t.
if p is known to be a predicate that is defined completely under the condition.
Principle 6: Exactly N
This principle captures the encoding of cardinality constraints in the presence of inconsistency.
For instance, in Jobs Puzzle, the sentences “Every person holds exactly two jobs” and “Every job
is held by exactly one person” are encoded as cardinality constraints:
2 {hold(X ,Y ) : t if job(Y ) : t} 2 ← person(X) : t.
1 {hold(X ,Y) : t if person(X) : t} 1 ← job(Y ) : t.
hold(X ,Y) : f ← person(X) : t ∧ job(Y ) : t ∧ ¬hold(X ,Y ) : t.
These constraints count both true and inconsistent hold-facts, but can be easily modified to count
only consistent true facts. Note the role of the last rule, which closes off the information being
counted by the constraint. This is necessary because if, say, Pete is concluded to hold exactly two
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jobs (of an actor and a phone operator) then there should be nothing unknown about him holding
any other job. Instead, hold(pete,X) : f∧hold(pete,X) :⊤ should be true for any other job X .
The general form of the exactly N constraint is:
N {L : t if condition} N ← guard.
L : f ← guard ∧ condition ∧ ¬L : t.
As in ASP, such statements can be represented as a number of ground disjunctive rules. The
“exactly N” constraints can be generalized to “at least N and at most M” constraints, if we extend
the semantics in the direction of (Soininen et al. 2001).
7 Comparison with Other Work
Although a great deal of work is dedicated to paraconsistent logics and logical formalizations for
word puzzles separately, we are unaware of any work that applies paraconsistent logics to solv-
ing word puzzles that might contain inconsistencies. As we demonstrated, mere encoding of such
puzzles in a paraconsistent logic leads to an explosion of possible worlds, which is not helpful.4
Most paraconsistent logics (Priest et al. 2015; J. Y. Beziau 2007; Belnap Jr 1977; da Costa 1974)
deal with inconsistency from the philosophical or mathematical point of view and do not discuss
knowledge representation. Other paraconsistent logics (Blair and Subrahmanian 1989; Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992)
were developed for definite logic programs and cannot be easily applied to solving more com-
plex knowledge representation problems that arise in word puzzles. An interesting question is
whether our use of APC is essential, i.e., whether the notions of consistency-preferred models
can be adapted to other paraconsistent logics and the relationship with ASP can be established.
First, it is clear that such an adaptation is unlikely for proof-theoretic approaches to inconsistency,
such as (da Costa 1974). We do not know if such an adaptation is possible for model-theoretic
approaches, such as (Belnap Jr 1977).
On the word puzzles front, (Wos et al. 1984) used the first-order logic theorem prover OT-
TER to solve Jobs Puzzle5 and (Shapiro 2011) represented Jobs Puzzle in multiple logical lan-
guages: TPTP,6 Constraint Lingo (Finkel et al. 2004) layered on top of the ASP system Smodels
(Syrjänen and Niemelä 2001) as the backend, and the SNePS commonsense reasoning system
(Shapiro 2000). More recently, (Baral and Dzifcak 2012; Schwitter 2013) represented word puz-
zles using NL/CNL sentences, and then automatically translate them into ASP. None of these
underlying formalisms, FOL, ASP, and SNePS, are equipped to reason in the presence of incon-
sistency. In contrast, APCLP, combined with the knowledge representation principles developed
in Section 6, localizes inconsistency and computes useful possible worlds. In addition, APCLP
has mechanisms to control how inconsistency is propagated through inference, it allows one to
prioritize inconsistent information, and it provides several other ways to express user’s intent
(through contraposition, completion of knowledge, etc.).
8 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed the problem of knowledge representation in the presence of inconsis-
tent information with particular focus on representing English sentences using logic, as in word
4 Also see Appendix A and the ready-to-run examples at https://bitbucket.org/tiantiangao/apc_lp .
5 http://www.mcs.anl.gov/~wos/mathproblems/jobs.txt
6 http://www.cs.miami.edu/~tptp/cgi-bin/SeeTPTP?Category=Problems&Domain=PUZ&File=PUZ019-1.p
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puzzles (Wos et al. 1984; Shapiro 2011; Ponnuru et al. 2004; Schwitter 2013; Baral and Dzifcak 2012).
We have shown that a number of considerations play a role in deciding on a particular encoding,
which includes whether or not inconsistency should be propagated through implications, relative
degrees of confidence in different pieces of information, and others. We used the well-known
Jobs, Zebra and Marathon puzzles (see the appendices in the supplemental material) to illustrate
many of the above issues and show how the conclusions change with the introduction of different
kinds of inconsistency into the puzzle.
As a technical tool, we started with a paraconsistent logic called Annotated Predicate Calcu-
lus (Kifer and Lozinskii 1992) and then gave it a special kind of non-monotonic semantics that
is based on consistency-preferred stable models. We also showed that these models can be com-
puted using ASP systems that support preference relations over stable models, such as Clingo
(Gebser et al. 2011) with the Asprin extension (Brewka et al. 2015).
For future work, we will consider additional puzzles which may suggest new knowledge rep-
resentation principles. In addition, we will investigate ways to incorporate inconsistency into
CNL systems. This will require introduction of background knowledge into these systems and
linguistic cues into the grammar.
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Appendix A Jobs Puzzle in APCLP with Inconsistency Injections
We now present a complete APCLP encoding of Jobs Puzzle and highlight the principles, intro-
duced in Section 6, used in the encoding. We also show several cases of inconsistency injection
and discuss the consequences. The English sentences are based on the CNL representation of
Jobs Puzzle from Section 3 in (Schwitter 2013) where “Steve” is changed to “Robin” for the
sake of an example (because Robin can be both a male and a female name).
1 Roberta is a person. Thelma is a person. Robin is a person. Pete is a person.
person(roberta) : t. person(thelma) : t. person(robin) : t. person(pete) : t.
2 Roberta is a female. Thelma is a female.
female(roberta) : t. female(thelma) : t.
3 Robin is male. Pete is male.
male(robin) : t. male(pete) : t.
Sentence 4 is encoded based on Principle 3, which treats male and female as polar facts.
4 Exclude that a person is male and that the person is female.
male(X) : t ∨ female(X) : t ← person(X) : t.
male(X) : f ∨ female(X) : f ← person(X) : t.
female(X) :⊤ ← person(X) : t ∧ male(X) :⊤.
male(X) :⊤ ← person(X) : t ∧ female(X) :⊤.
We encode sentences 5 and 6 using Principle 6, which constrains the cardinality of hold(X ,
Y ). This will cause second rule in Sentence 5 to be repeated as part of encoding of Sentence 6,
so we omit the duplicate.
5 If there is a job then exactly one person holds that job.
1 {hold(X ,Y ) : t i f person(X) : t} 1 ← job(Y ) : t.
hold(X ,Y ) : f ← person(X) : t ∧ job(Y ) : t ∧ ¬hold(X ,Y ) : t.
6 If there is a person then the person holds exactly two jobs.
2 {hold(X ,Y ) : t i f job(Y ) : t} 2 ← person(X) : t.
Encoding of the following facts is straightforward:
7 Chef is a job. Guard is a job. Nurse is a job. Operator is a job. Police is a job. Teacher is a
job. Actor is a job. Boxer is a job.
job(chef) : t. job(guard) : t. job(nurse) : t. job(operator) : t.
job(police) : t. job(teacher) : t. job(actor) : t. job(boxer) : t.
Sentences 8-13 are encoded based on Principles 1 and 2, where contrapositive inference and
propagation of inconsistency are allowed for some literals but not others. Notice that it is unde-
sirable to allow propagation of inconsistency from person-facts and job-facts, since it is unrea-
sonable to conclude that somebody is, say, a male while being unsure that this somebody is a
person. Ditto about the jobs. Contrapositive reasoning (say, from non-male to non-person) is also
inappropriate here because we have higher confidence in someone being a person. So, we use
ontological implication ← in the next group of rules.
8 If a person holds a job as a nurse then that person is a male.
(male(X) : t <∼ hold(X ,nurse) : t) ← person(X) : t ∧ job(nurse) : t ∧
¬person(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬ job(nurse) :⊤.
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9 If a person holds a job as an actor then that person is a male.
(male(X) : t <∼ hold(X ,actor) : t) ← person(X) : t ∧ job(actor) : t ∧
¬person(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬ job(actor) :⊤.
10 If a first person holds a job as a chef and a second person holds a job as a telephone operator
then the second person is a husband of the first person.
(husband(Y,X) : t <∼ hold(X ,chef) : t ∧ hold(Y,operator) : t) ←
person(X) : t ∧ job(chef) : t ∧ person(Y ) : t ∧ job(operator) : t ∧
¬person(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬ job(chef) :⊤ ∧ ¬person(Y ) : ∧ ¬ job(operator) :⊤.
11 If a first person is a husband of a second person then the first person is male.
(male(X) : t <∼ husband(X ,Y) : t) ← person(X) : t ∧ person(Y ) : t ∧
¬person(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬person(Y ) :⊤.
12 If a first person is a husband of a second person then the second person is female.
(female(Y ) : t <∼ husband(X ,Y) : t) ← person(X) : t ∧ person(Y ) : t ∧
¬person(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬person(Y ) :⊤.
13 Exclude that Roberta holds a job as boxer.
hold(roberta,boxer) : f ← job(boxer) : t ∧ ¬ job(boxer) :⊤.
Encoding of the following fact is straightforward.
14 Exclude that Pete is educated.
educated(pete) : f.
Sentences 15-20 are also encoded based on Principles 1 and 2.
15 If a person holds a job as nurse then the person is educated.
(educated(X) : t <∼ hold(X ,nurse) : t) ← person(X) : t ∧ job(nurse) : t ∧
¬person(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬ job(nurse) :⊤.
16 If a person holds a job as a police officer then that person is educated.
(educated(X) : t <∼ hold(X , police) : t) ← person(X) : t ∧ job(police) : t ∧
¬person(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬ job(police) :⊤.
17 If a person holds a job as a teacher then the person is educated.
(educated(X) : t <∼ hold(X , teacher) : t) ← person(X) : t ∧ job(teacher) : t ∧
¬person(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬ job(teacher) :⊤.
18 Exclude that Roberta holds a job as a chef.
hold(roberta,chef) : f ← job(chef) : t ∧ ¬ job(chef) :⊤.
19 Exclude that Roberta holds a job as a police officer.
hold(roberta, police) : f ← job(police) : t ∧ ¬ job(police) :⊤.
20 Exclude that a person holds a job as a chef and that the same person holds a job as a police
officer.
hold(X ,chef) : f ∨ hold(X , police) : f ← person(X) : t ∧ job(chef) : t ∧
job(police) : t ∧ ¬person(X) :⊤ ∧
¬ job(chef) :⊤ ∧ ¬ job(police) :⊤.
Next we define the consistency preference relation <S , where S = (s1,s2,s3,B⊤), which
implements Principle 4. Here s1 says that we hold greater confidence in the information about
someone being a person and something being a job than in any other kind of information in
the puzzle. That is, these facts are least likely to be inconsistent. Next, s2 says that we are very
likely to believe that Pete is a male name and Thelma and Roberta are female names. We are not
sure about Robin, so s/he is left out in s2. The set s3 says that next we are likely to believe the
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information on who holds which jobs. The last component in S , B⊤, is the usual default that
prefers the most e-consistent models.
s1 = {person(roberta) :⊤, person(thelma) :⊤, person(robin) :⊤, person(pete) :⊤,
job(chef) :⊤, job(guard) :⊤, job(nurse) :⊤, job(operator) :⊤,
job(police) :⊤, job(teacher) :⊤, job(actor) :⊤, job(boxer) :⊤}
s2 = {male(pete) :⊤, female(thelma) :⊤, female(roberta) :⊤}
s3 = {hold(pete,chef) :⊤, hold(pete,guard) :⊤, hold(pete,nurse) :⊤, hold(pete,
operator) :⊤, hold(pete, police) :⊤, hold(pete, teacher) :⊤, hold(pete,
actor) :⊤, hold(pete,boxer) :⊤, . . . }
It is interesting to note that if s3 is not included then, in some cases, there might be too many
possibilities to solve the puzzle by allowing hold-predicates to be inconsistent. This is because
many rules and constraints in the puzzle use hold as a premise. So, without minimizing the
possibility of inconsistency in hold those rules and constraints become vacuously true, leading
to an explosion of the possible worlds.
The APCLP encoding generates one most consistency preferred model where the information
concerning hold/2 is
hold(pete,actor) : t hold(pete,operator) : t hold(robin, police) : t
hold(robin,nurse) : t hold(thelma,chef) : t hold(thelma,boxer) : t
hold(roberta,guard) : t hold(roberta, teacher) : t
Not surprisingly, this solution matches other approaches because so far we have not injected
inconsistency (and so, for example, the preferences s1, s2, and s3 do not matter here).
Next, we illustrate five cases of injection of inconsistency into the puzzle. Since complete
models tend to be rather large, we show only hold/2 and ⊤-predicates.
21 Thelma is an actor — Variation 1
hold(thelma,actor) : t.
This makes Thelma’s job assignment as an actor inconsistent and we get this model:
m = {hold(pete,boxer) : t hold(pete,operator) : t hold(robin, police) : t
hold(robin,nurse) : t hold(thelma,actor) :⊤ hold(thelma,chef) : t
hold(roberta, teacher) : t hold(roberta,guard) : t}
Indeed, the original puzzle implies that Thelma is not an actor. Given that hold(thelma,actor) : t
is true, Sentence 9 will sanction two possibilities: one where male(thelma) : t is true and the other
where hold(thelma,actor) : ⊤ is true. In the first case, Sentence 4 will force male(thelma) : ⊤
and female(thelma) :⊤ into the model. In the second case, we will have hold(thelma,actor) :⊤
in the model. Given that we have high confidence in Thelma’s gender (preference s2), we hold
her gender less likely to be inconsistent. Thus, the first case gets eliminated.
The next variation assumes that Robin is a female (instead of Thelma being an actor in Varia-
tion 1).
22 Robin is female — Variation 2
female(robin) : t.
There are two models:
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m1 = {hold(pete,actor) : t hold(pete,operator) : t hold(robin, police) : t
hold(robin,nurse) : t hold(roberta, teacher) : t hold(thelma,boxer) : t
hold(roberta,guard) : t hold(thelma,chef) : t husband(pete, thelma) : t
male(robin) :⊤ female(robin) :⊤}
m2 = {hold(pete,actor) : t hold(pete,operator) : t hold(robin,nurse) : t
hold(robin,chef) : t hold(thelma,boxer) : t hold(thelma, police) : t
hold(roberta,guard) : t hold(roberta, teacher) : t husband(pete,robin) : t
female(robin) :⊤ male(robin) :⊤}
Sentences 3 and 4 imply inconsistency regarding Robin’s gender. The first model is the same
as in the original puzzle (as far as the job assignments go). In the second model, since Robin’s
gender is inconsistent (both male and female), it is compatible to make Robin a chef and Thelma
a police officer. Therefore, we derive that Pete is Robin’s husband instead of Thelma’s.
The next variation of the original puzzle explicitly assumes that Robin is Thelma’s husband.
23 Robin is a husband of Thelma — Variation 3
husband(robin, thelma) : t.
Here we need to add more background knowledge about marital relations. For instance, that
every person can marry or be married to at most one person. Together with Sentence 23, this
will cause inconsistency because the original puzzle implies that Pete is Thelma’s husband. In
(Schwitter 2013), this implicit knowledge is not stated, so it will fail to detect inconsistency.
If such background knowledge were added to Schwitter’s formulation as constraints then there
would be no models. The background knowledge we need is:
24 A person who is a male is a husband of exactly one other person, or that person is null.
25 A person who is a female has exactly one husband or that husband is null.
26 Exclude that person X is a husband of Y and person Z is a husband of X simultaneously.
27 If it is not derivable that person X is person Y’s husband, then X is not Y’s husband.
Sentences 24 – 26 are cardinality constraints and are encoded based on Principle 6. Sentence 27
says that the information about husbands is complete; it is encoded based on Principle 5. Also,
we block propagation of inconsistency from male and female based on Principle 2.
1 {husband(X ,Y) : t i f (person(Y ) : t or Y = null)} 1 ←
person(X) : t ∧ male(X) : t ∧ ¬male(X) :⊤.
1 {husband(X ,Y) : t i f (person(X) : t or X = null)} 1 ←
person(Y ) : t ∧ female(Y ) : t ∧ ¬female(Y ) :⊤.
:− husband(X ,Y) : t ∧ husband(Z,X) : t ∧ X ! = null.
husband(X ,Y) : f ← person(X) : t ∧ person(Y ) : ∧ ¬husband(X ,Y) : t.
There are six models. When these models are projected on hold/2 (which constitutes the
solution to the puzzle) and the ⊤-predicates, we get three distinct sets:
m1 = {hold(pete,actor) : t hold(pete, police) : t hold(robin,operator) : t
hold(robin,nurse) : t hold(roberta, teacher) : t hold(roberta,guard) : t
hold(thelma,boxer) : t hold(thelma,chef) : t educated(pete) :⊤}
m2 = {hold(pete,actor) : t hold(pete,nurse) : t hold(robin,operator) : t
hold(robin, police) : t hold(roberta, teacher) : t hold(roberta,guard) : t
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hold(thelma,boxer) : t hold(thelma,chef) : t educated(pete) :⊤}
m3 = {hold(pete, police) : t hold(pete,nurse) : t hold(robin,operator) : t
hold(robin,actor) : t hold(roberta, teacher) : t hold(roberta,guard) : t
hold(thelma,boxer) : t hold(thelma,chef) : t educated(pete) :⊤}
The puzzle originally implied that Pete is Thelma’s husband. Since we now explicitly stated
that Robin is Thelma’s husband, Sentences 25 and 27 will force husband(pete, thelma) : f to
hold. By Sentence 10, hold(pete,operator) : t and hold(Thelma,chef) : t cannot hold simultane-
ously, so many solutions with inconsistencies in them will be generated. Due to the consistency
preference relations, the APCLP encoding will prefer the models where educated(pete) :⊤ holds.
Sentences 24 and 25 sanction two possibilities for the husband information in each of the
above models. For instance, the model m1 corresponds to two models out of the six models
that we get; they differ only in their husband information. Given that Pete is not an operator
and Roberta is not a chef, Pete is not necessarily Roberta’s husband. Therefore, there are two
cases: one where husband(pete,roberta) : t holds and the other where husband(pete,null) : t
and husband(null,roberta) : t hold. Similar considerations apply to m2 and m3.
The next variation applies the background knowledge about husbands from Variation 3 to
Variations 1 and 2.
28 Thelma is an actor. — Variation 4.1 (modification of Variation 1)
hold(thelma,actor) : t.
Sentences 24 – 27.
There are now two models, and their projections on hold- and ⊤-predicates are compatible
with the solution to Variation 1. The only difference between these two models is in husband-
predicates, so we show only that part.
m1 = {husband(pete, thelma) : t, husband(robin,roberta) : t}
m2 = {husband(pete, thelma) : t, husband(robin,null) : t, husband(null,roberta) : t}
29 Robin is a female. — Variation 4.2 (modification of Variation 2)
female(robin) : t.
Sentences 24 – 27.
There are three models and their projections on hold- and ⊤-predicates are compatible with
Variation 2. The only difference with Variation 2 is in the husband-predicates, which we show:
m1 = {husband(pete, thelma) : t, husband(robin,roberta) : t}
m2 = {husband(pete, thelma) : t, husband(robin,null) : t, husband(null,roberta) : t}
m3 = {husband(pete,robin) : t, husband(null, thelma) : t, husband(null,roberta) : t}
Here m1 and m2 correspond to the first model in Variation 2 and m3 corresponds to the second
model there.
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Appendix B Zebra Puzzle in APCLP with Inconsistency Injections
We now present a complete APCLP encoding of the original Zebra Puzzle as is described in
Wikipedia.7 A slightly different version of the puzzle appears in TPTP.8 The encoding high-
lights the principles introduced in Section 6 and we also discuss several cases of inconsistency
injection.
(a) There are five houses.
(b) The Englishman lives in the red house.
(c) The Spaniard owns the dog.
(d) Coffee is drunk in the green house.
(e) The Ukrainian drinks tea.
(f) The green house is immediately to the right of the ivory house.
(g) The Old Gold smoker owns snails.
(h) Kools are smoked in the yellow house.
(i) Milk is drunk in the middle house.
(j) The Norwegian lives in the first house.
(k) The man who smokes Chesterfields lives in the house next to the man with the fox.
(l) Kools are smoked in the house next to the house where the horse is kept.
(m) The Lucky Strike smoker drinks orange juice.
(n) The Japanese smokes Parliaments.
(o) The Norwegian lives next to the blue house.
Now, who drinks water? Who owns the zebra?
In the interest of clarity, it must be added that each of the five houses is painted a different
color, and their inhabitants are of different national extractions, own different pets, drink
different beverages and smoke different brands of American cigarettes [sic]. One other
thing: in statement 6, right means your right.
— Life International, December 17, 1962
Zebra Puzzle implies some background knowledge, which we must add. First, there is a one-
to-one correspondence between houses and colors (and persons, drinks, cigarettes, and pets).
Second, we assume that the first house stands on the extreme left and the fifth house stands on
the extreme right. The first and the fifth house are not next to each other. A house is on the
right of another house if the latter is to the left of the former. Right-to and left-to imply next-to
and next-to is a symmetric relation. Next, we list the facts and the rules that encode the puzzle.
For clarity statement is related to an appropriate English statement from the puzzle or from the
implicit information mentioned above.
Sentences 1-5 provide the house-, color-, person-, cigarette-, and pet-facts.
1 There are five houses: #1, #2, #3, #4, and #5.
house(1) : t. house(2) : t. house(3) : t. house(4) : t. house(5) : t.
2 There are five colors: yellow, blue, red, ivory, and green.
color(yellow) : t. color(blue) : t. color(red) : t. color(ivory) : t. color(green) : t.
3 There are five people: Norwegian, Ukrainian, Englishman, Spaniard, and Japanese.
person(norwegian) : t. person(ukrainian) : t. person(englishman) : t.
7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zebra_Puzzle
8 http://www.cs.miami.edu/~tptp/cgi-bin/SeeTPTP?Category=Problems&Domain=PUZ&File=PUZ010-1.p
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person(spaniard) : t. person( japanese) : t.
4 There are five drinks: water, tea, milk, orange juice, and coffee.
drink(water) : t. drink(tea) : t. drink(milk) : t. drink(orange_ juice) : t.
drink(coffee) : t.
5 There are five cigarettes: Kools, Chesterfield, Old Gold, Luck Strike, and Parliament.
cigarette(kools) : t. cigarette(chesterfield) : t. cigarette(old_gold) : t.
cigarette(lucky_strike) : t. cigarette(parliament) : t.
6 There are five pets: fox, horse, snails, dog, and zebra.
pet(fox) : t. pet(horse) : t. pet(snails) : t. pet(dog) : t. pet(zebra) : t.
Sentences 7-16 describe the implicit knowledge about the one-to-one correspondence be-
tween houses, colors, persons, drinks, cigarettes, and pets. They are encoded as the cardinality
constraints on the predicates house_color(H,C), house_nationality(H,N), house_drink(H,D),
house_smoke(H,C), and house_pet(H,P). We encode Sentences 7 - 8 using Principles 5 and 6.
This will cause the second rule in Sentence 8 to be repeated as part of the encoding of Sentence
7, so we omit the duplicate. The rest of the sentences follow the same idea.
7 Each house has exactly one color.
1{house_color(H,C) : t i f color(C) : t}1 ← house(H) : t.
house_color(H,C) : f ← house(H) : t ∧ color(C) : t ∧ ¬house_color(H,C) : t.
8 Each color is for exactly one house.
1{house_color(H,C) : t i f house(H) : t}1 ← color(C) : t.
9 Each house is home for exactly one person.
1{house_nationality(H,N) : t i f person(N) : t}1 ← house(H) : t.
house_nationality(H,N) : f ← house(H) : t ∧ person(N) : t ∧
¬house_nationality(H,N) : t.
10 Each person lives in exactly one house.
1{house_nationality(H,N) : t i f house(H) : t}1 ← person(N) : t.
11 Each house has exactly one favorite drink.
1{house_drink(H,D) : t i f drink(D) : t}1 ← house(H) : t.
house_drink(H,D) : f ← house(H) : t ∧ drink(D) : t ∧ ¬house_drink(H,D) : t.
12 Each drink is drunk in exactly one house.
1{house_drink(H,D) : t i f house(H) : t}1 ← drink(D) : t.
13 Each house has exactly one brand of cigarettes.
1{house_smoke(H,S) : t i f cigarette(S) : t}1 ← house(H) : t.
house_smoke(H,S) : f ← house(H) : t ∧ cigarette(S) : t ∧ ¬house_smoke(H,S) : t.
14 Each brand of cigarettes is smoked in exactly one house.
1{house_smoke(H,S) : t i f house(H) : t}1 ← cigarette(S) : t.
15 Each house has exactly one pet.
1{house_pet(H,P) : t i f pet(P) : t}1 ← house(H) : t.
house_pet(H,P) : f ← house(H) : t ∧ pet(P) : t ∧ ¬house_pet(H,P) : t.
16 Each pet is kept in exactly one house.
1{house_pet(H,P) : t i f house(H) : t}1 ← pet(P) : t.
Sentences 17-20 correspond to Sentences (b)-(e) in the original puzzle. The encoding is based
on Principles 1 and 2, where contrapositive inference and propagation of inconsistency are al-
lowed for some literals but not others. Notice that it is undesirable to allow propagation of incon-
sistency from house-facts, since it is unreasonable to conclude that somebody lives in a house
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while being unsure that something is a house. Contrapositive reasoning is also inappropriate here.
For instance, if there is uncertainty about the color of a house, it is unreasonable to conclude that
something is not a house because one is much more likely to discern a house than its color. So,
in the next group of rules, we separate house(H) from color and other facts using use ontological
implication ←.
17 If the Englishman lives in a house then the color of the house is red.
(house_color(H,red) : t <∼ house_nationality(H,englishman) : t)
← house(H) : t ∧ ¬house(H) :⊤.
18 If the Spaniard lives in a house then dog is kept in the house.
(house_pet(H,dog) : t <∼ house_nationality(H,spaniard) : t)
← house(H) : t ∧ ¬house(H) :⊤.
19 If the color of a house is green then coffee is drunk in the house.
(house_drink(H,coffee) : t <∼ house_color(H,green) : t)
← house(H) : t ∧ ¬house(H) :⊤.
20 If the Ukrainian lives in a house then tea is drunk in the house.
(house_drink(H, tea) : t <∼ house_nationality(H,ukrainian) : t)
← house(H) : t ∧ ¬house(H) :⊤.
Sentences 21-22 define the implicit knowledge of the right(X,Y) relation. We encode each
sentence based on Principle 2.
21 A house numbered X is to the right of another house numbered Y if X − 1 = Y.
right(X ,Y ) : t ← house(X) : t ∧ house(Y) : t ∧ X − 1 = Y.
¬house(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(Y ) :⊤.
22 A house numbered X is not to right of another house numbered Y if X − 1 6= Y.
right(X ,Y ) : f ← house(X) : t ∧ house(Y) : t ∧ X − 1 6= Y.
¬house(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(Y ) :⊤.
Sentences 23-25 correspond to Sentence (f). The encoding of Sentences 23-24 is straightfor-
ward. The encoding of Sentence 25 is based on Principles 1 and 2.
23 The color of the first house is not green.
house_color(1,green) : f.
24 The color of the fifth house is not ivory.
house_color(5, ivory) : f.
25 If a house is to the right of another house and the color of the former house is green then
the color of the latter house is ivory.
(house_color(Left, ivory) : t <∼ house_color(Right,green) : t)
← house(Left) : t ∧ house(Right) : t ∧ right(Right,Left) : t ∧
¬house(Left) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(Right) :⊤ ∧ ¬right(Right,Left) :⊤.
Sentences 26-27 below correspond to Sentences (g)-(h). The encoding is based on Principles
1 and 2.
26 If Old Gold is smoked in a house then snails are kept in the house.
(house_pet(H,snails) : t <∼ house_smoke(H,old_gold) : t)
← house(H) : t ∧ ¬house(H) :⊤.
27 If Kools is smoked in a house then the color of the house is yellow.
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(house_smoke(H,kools) : t <∼ house_color(H,yellow) : t)
← house(H) : t ∧ ¬house(H) :⊤.
Sentences 28-29 below correspond to Sentences (i)-(j). The encoding is straightforward.
28 Milk is drunk in the middle house.
house_drink(3,milk) : t.
29 The Norwegian lives in the first house.
house_nationality(1,norwegian) : t.
Sentences 30-31 state the implicit knowledge of the next(X,Y) relation. We encode each sen-
tence based on Principle 2.
30 A house is next to another house if their house numbers differ by 1
next(X ,Y ) : t ← house(X) : t ∧ house(Y) : t ∧ |X −Y | = 1.
¬house(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(Y ) :⊤.
31 A house is not next to another house if their house numbers do not differ by 1
next(X ,Y ) : f ← house(X) : t ∧ house(Y) : t ∧ |X −Y | 6= 1.
¬house(X) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(Y ) :⊤.
Sentences 32-34 correspond to Sentence (k). Sentences 32-33 are encoded based on Principle
1. Sentence 34 is encoded based on Principles 1 and 2.
32 If Chesterfield is smoked in the first house then fox is kept in the second house.
house_pet(2, fox) : t <∼ house_smoke(1,chesterfield) : t.
33 If Chesterfield is smoked in the fifth house then fox is kept in the fourth house.
house_pet(4, fox) : t <∼ house_smoke(5,chesterfield) : t.
34 If a house is next to another house and Chesterfield is smoked in the former house then fox
is kept in the latter house.
(house_pet(H1, fox) : t ∨ house_pet(H3, fox) : t <∼ house_smoke(H2,chesterfield) : t)
← house(H1) : t ∧ house(H2) : t ∧ house(H3) : t ∧
H1 6= H3 ∧ next(H1,H2) : t ∧ next(H2,H3) : t ∧
¬house(H1) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(H2) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(H3) : t :⊤ ∧
¬next(H1,H2) : t :⊤ ∧ ¬next(H2,H3) :⊤.
Sentences 35-37 correspond to Sentence (l). The encoding follows the same idea as Sentences
32-34.
35 If Kools are smoked in the first house then horse is kept in the second house
house_pet(2,horse) : t <∼ house_smoke(1,kools) : t.
36 If Kools are smoked in the fifth house then horse is kept in the fourth house.
house_pet(4,horse) : t <∼ house_smoke(5,kools) : t.
37 If a house is next to another house and Kools are smoked in the former house then horse is
kept in the latter house.
(house_pet(H1,horse) : t ∨ house_pet(H3,horse) : t <∼ house_smoke(H2,kools) : t)
← house(H1) : t ∧ house(H2) : t ∧ house(H3) : t ∧
H1 6= H3 ∧ next(H1,H2) : t ∧ next(H2,H3) : t ∧
¬house(H1) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(H2) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(H3) : t :⊤ ∧
¬next(H1,H2) : t :⊤ ∧ ¬next(H2,H3) :⊤.
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Sentences 38-39 below correspond to Sentences (m)-(n). The encoding is based on Principles
1 and 2.
38 If Lucky Strike is smoked in a house then orange juice is drunk in that house.
(house_drink(H,orange_ juice) : t <∼ house_smoke(H, lucky_strike) : t)
← house(H) : t ∧ ¬house(H) :⊤.
39 If the Japanese lives in a house then parliament is smoked in that house.
(house_smoke(H, parliament) : t <∼ house_nationality(H, japanese) : t)
← house(H) : t ∧ ¬house(H) :⊤.
Sentences 40-42 correspond to Sentence (o). The encoding follows the same idea as Sentences
32-34.
40 If the Norwegian lives in the first house then the color of the second house is blue.
house_color(2,blue) : t <∼ house_nationality(1,norwegian) : t.
41 If the Norwegian lives in the fifth house then the color of the fourth house is blue.
house_color(4,blue) : t <∼ house_nationality(5,norwegian) : t.
42 If a house is next to another house and the Norwegian lives in the former house then the
color of the latter house is blue.
(house_color(H1,blue) : t ∨ house_color(H3,blue) : t
<∼ house_nationality(H2,norwegian) : t)
← house(H1) : t ∧ house(H2) : t ∧ house(H3) : t ∧
H1 6= H3 ∧ next(H1,H2) : t ∧ next(H2,H3) : t ∧
¬house(H1) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(H2) :⊤ ∧ ¬house(H3) : t :⊤ ∧
¬next(H1,H2) : t :⊤ ∧ ¬next(H2,H3) :⊤.
Next we define the consistency preference relation <S , where S = (s1,s2,B⊤), which im-
plements Principle 4. Here s1 says that we hold greater confidence in the information about
the house-, color-, person-, cigarette-, and pet-, next, right-facts. We remind that “greater con-
fidence" here means that these facts are least likely to be inconsistent. The preference s2 says
that next we are likely to be confident in the information given by the house_color(H,C),
house_nationality(H,N), house_drink(H,D), house_smoke(H,C), house_pet(H,P) facts. The
last component in S , B⊤, is the usual default that gives preference to the most e-consistent
models.
s1 = {house(1) :⊤, . . . , house(5) :⊤, color(yellow) :⊤, . . . , color(green) :⊤,
person(norwegian) :⊤, . . . , person( japanese) :⊤, drink(water) :⊤, . . . ,
drink(co f f e) :⊤, cigarette(kools) :⊤, . . . , cigarette(parliament) :⊤,
pet(fox) :⊤, . . . , pet(zebra) :⊤}.
s2 = {house_color(1,yellow) :⊤, . . . , house_color(5,green) :⊤,
house_nationality(1,norwegian) :⊤, . . . , house_nationality(5, japanese) :⊤,
house_drink(1,water) :⊤, . . . , house_drink(5,co f f e) :⊤,
house_smoke(1,kools) :⊤, . . . , house_smoke(5, parliament) :⊤,
house_pet(1, fox) :⊤, . . . , house_pet(5,zebra) :⊤}.
To better illustrate the result, we define a single predicate tuple/6 to represent the combined
information of a house: its associated color, person, drink, cigarette, and pet.
tuple(H,C,N,D,S,P) : t ← house_color(H,C) : t ∧ house_nationality(H,N) : t ∧
house_drink(H,D) : t ∧ house_smoke(H,S) : t ∧
house_pet(H,P) : t.
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There is a single most consistency preferred model:
tuple(1, yellow, norwegian, water, kools, fox) : t
tuple(2, blue, ukrainian, tea, chesterfield, horse) : t
tuple(3, red, englishman, milk, old_gold, snails) : t
tuple(4, ivory, spaniard, orange_ juice, lucky_strike, dog) : t
tuple(5, green, japanese, coffee, parliament, zebra) : t
Not surprisingly, this solution matches the usual correct solution because so far we have not
injected any inconsistency and so, for example, the preferences s1 and s2 play no role.
Next, we illustrate three cases of injection of inconsistency into the puzzle. Since complete
models tend to be rather large, we show only tuple/6 and ⊤-predicates.
43 The Ukrainian lives in the middle house — Variation 1
house_nationality(3,ukrainian) : t.
There are two models:
m1 = {tuple(1, yellow, norwegian, water, kools, zebra) : t
tuple(2, blue, japanese, tea, parliament, horse) : t
tuple(3, ivory, ukrainian, milk, old_gold, snails) : t
tuple(4, green, spaniard, coffee, chesterfield, dog) : t
tuple(5, red, englishman, orange_ juice, lucky_strike, fox) : t
house_nationality(3, ukrainian) :⊤}
m2 = {tuple(1, yellow, norwegian, tea, kools, zebra) : t
tuple(2, blue, japanese, water, parliament, horse) : t
tuple(3, ivory, ukrainian, milk, old_gold, snails) : t
tuple(4, green, spaniard, coffee, chesterfield, dog) : t
tuple(5, red, englishman, orange_ juice, lucky_strike, fox) : t
house_nationality(3, ukrainian) :⊤}
The puzzle originally implied that the Ukrainian lives in the second house. Therefore, Variation
1 generates an inconsistency about the Ukrainian being in the middle house. By Sentence 20, we
cannot derive house_drink(3, tea) : t because propagation of inconsistency is blocked in this case.
This sanctions two possibilities: one where house_drink(1,water) : t and house_drink(2, tea) : t
hold and the other where house_drink(1, tea) : t and house_drink(2,water) : t hold.
44 The Lucky Strike is smoked in the middle house — Variation 2
house_smoke(3, lucky_strike) : t.
Again, we have two models:
m1 = {tuple(1, yellow, norwegian, water, kools, fox) : t
tuple(2, blue, ukrainian, tea, chesterfield, horse) : t
tuple(3, ivory, spaniard, milk, lucky_strike, dog) : t
tuple(4, green, japanese, coffee, parliament, zebra) : t
tuple(5, red, englishman, orange_ juice, old_gold, snails) : t
house_smoke(3, lucky_strike) :⊤}
m2 = {tuple(1, yellow, norwegian, orange_ juice, kools, fox) : t
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tuple(2, blue, ukrainian, tea, chesterfield, horse) : t
tuple(3, ivory, spaniard, milk, lucky_strike, dog) : t
tuple(4, green, japanese, coffee, parliament, zebra) : t
tuple(5, red, englishman, water, old_gold, snails) : t
house_smoke(3, lucky_strike) :⊤}
The puzzle originally implied that the Lucky Strike is smoked in the fourth house. As a result,
Variation 2 generates an inconsistency regarding the Lucky Strike being smoked in the middle
house. By Sentence 38, we cannot derive house_drink(3,orange_ juice) : t because propagation
of inconsistency is blocked by the epistemic implication. This sanctions two possibilities: one
where house_drink(1,water) : t and house_drink(5,orange_ juice) : t hold and the other where
house_drink(1,orange_ juice) : t and house_drink(5,water) : t hold.
45 Milk is not drunk in the middle house — Variation 3
house_drink(3,milk) : f.
Variation 3 generates the same model as Zebra Puzzle’s original solution except for an additional
inconsistent fact house_drink(3,milk) :⊤. This is because the puzzle originally implied that milk
is drunk in the middle house.
Appendix C Marathon Puzzle in APCLP with Inconsistency Injections
We present here a complete APCLP encoding of Marathon Puzzle (C. Guéret and Sevaux 2000;
Schwitter 2012). As with the previous puzzles, the encoding highlights the principles of Section 6
and we also discuss several cases of inconsistency injection.
Marathon puzzle is as follows:
Dominique, Ignace, Naren, Olivier, Philippe, and Pascal have arrived as the first six at the
Paris marathon.
Olivier has not arrived last.
Dominique, Pascal and Ignace have arrived before Naren and Olivier.
Dominique who was third last year has improved this year.
Philippe is among the first four.
Ignace has arrived neither in second nor third position.
Pascal has beaten Naren by three positions.
Neither Ignace nor Dominique are in the fourth position.
The original description implies some implicit background knowledge. First, no runners arrive
at the same time (i.e., each runner has a unique arrival position and vice versa). Second, a runner
arrives before another runner if the first runner’s position number is smaller than the second
runner’s position.
There is a unique solution for Marathon Puzzle where Ignace arrives first, followed by Do-
minique, Pascal, Philippe, Olivier, and Naren, in that order. Next, we show the encoding of
Marathon puzzle.
1 Dominique, Ignace, Naren, Olivier, Philippe, and Pascal have arrived as the first six at the
Paris marathon.
runner(dominique) : t. runner(naren) : t. runner(ignace) : t. runner(olivier) : t.
runner(philippe) : t. runner(pascal) : t.
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position(1) : t. position(2) : t. position(3) : t. position(4) : t. position(5) : t.
position(6) : t.
Sentences 2 and 3 are encoded based on Principles 5 and 6. This will cause the second rule
in Sentence 3 to be repeated as part of the encoding of Sentence 2 so, as before, we omit the
duplicate.
2 Every runner has exactly one position.
1{has_position(R,P) : t if position(P) : t}1← runner(R) : t.
has_position(R,P) : f← runner(R) : t ∧ position(P) : t ∧ ¬has_position(R,P) : t.
3 Every position belongs to exactly one runner.
1{has_position(R,P) : t if runner(R) : t}1← position(P) : t.
Encoding of Sentence 4 is straightforward.
4 Olivier has not arrived last.
has_position(olivier,6) : f.
Sentence 5 is encoded by three rules. The first and second rules are the result of applying
Principle 2 defining the before-relation based on the position of runners. The third rule represents
complete knowledge of the before-relation based on Principle 5.
5 If a runner R1 has a position P1 and another runner R2 has a position P2 and P1 < P2 then
R1 is before R2.
before(R1,R2) : t← runner(R1) : t ∧ position(P1) : t ∧ has_position(R1,P1) : t ∧
runner(R2) : t ∧ position(P2) : t ∧ has_position(R2,P2) : t ∧
P1 < P2 ∧ ¬runner(R1) :⊤ ∧ ¬runner(R2) :⊤ ∧
¬position(P1) :⊤ ∧ ¬position(P2) :⊤ ∧
¬has_position(R1,P1) :⊤ ∧ ¬has_position(R2,P2) :⊤.
before(R2,R1) : f← runner(R1) : t ∧ position(P1) : t ∧ has_position(R1,P1) : t ∧
runner(R2) : t ∧ position(P2) : t ∧ has_position(R2,P2) : t ∧
P1 < P2 ∧ ¬runner(R1) :⊤ ∧ ¬runner(R2) :⊤ ∧
¬position(P1) :⊤ ∧ ¬position(P2) :⊤ ∧
¬has_position(R1,P1) :⊤ ∧ ¬has_position(R2,P2) :⊤.
before(R1,R2) : f← runner(R1) : t ∧ runner(R2) : t ∧ ¬before(R1,R2) : t.
Encoding of Sentences 6 - 9 is straightforward.
6 Dominique, Pascal and Ignace have arrived before Naren and Olivier.
before(dominique,naren) : t. before(pascal,naren) : t. before(ignace,naren) : t.
before(dominique,olivier) : t. before(pascal,olivier) : t. before(ignace,olivier) : t.
7 Dominique who was third last year has improved this year.
has_position(dominique,1) : t ∨ has_position(dominique,2) : t.
8 Philippe is among the first four.
has_position(philippe,1) : t ∨ has_position(philippe,2) : t ∨
has_position(philippe,3) : t ∨ has_position(philippe,4) : t.
9 Ignace has arrived neither in second nor third position.
has_position(ignace,2) : f.
has_position(ignace,3) : f.
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Encoding of Sentence 10 is based on Principle 2. The first rule encodes that if the position
of Pascal is known, then the position of Naren is the position of Pascal plus 3. The second rule
encodes that if the position of Naren is known, then the position of Pascal is the position of Naren
minus 3.
10 Pascal has beaten Naren by three positions.
has_position(naren,P2) : t← has_position(pascal,P1) : t ∧ position(P1) : t ∧
position(P2) : t ∧ P2 = P1+ 3 ∧ ¬position(P1) :⊤ ∧
¬position(P2) :⊤ ∧ ¬has_position(pascal,P1) :⊤.
has_position(pascal,P1) : t← has_position(naren,P2) : t ∧ position(P1) : t ∧
position(P2) : t ∧ P2 = P1+ 3 ∧ ¬position(P1) :⊤ ∧
¬position(P2) :⊤ ∧ ¬has_position(naren,P2) :⊤.
Encoding of Sentence 11 is straightforward.
11 Neither Ignace nor Dominique are in the fourth position.
has_position(ignace,4) : f. has_position(dominique,4) : f.
Next we define the consistency preference relation <S , where S = (s1,s2,B⊤), which im-
plements Principle 4. Here s1 says that we hold greater confidence in the information about the
runner- and position-facts and therefore these types of facts are less likely to be inconsistent.
The preference s2 says that next we are likely to be confident in the information given by the
has_position- and before-facts. The last component in S , B⊤, is the usual default that gives
preference to the most e-consistent models.
s1 = {runner(dominique) :⊤, runner(naren) :⊤, runner(ignace) :⊤,
runner(olivier) :⊤, runner(philippe) :⊤, runner(pascal) :⊤,
position(1) :⊤, . . . , position(6) :⊤}.
s2 = {has_position(dominique,1) :⊤, . . . , has_position(dominique,6) :⊤, . . .
has_position(pascal,1) :⊤, . . . , has_position(pascal,6) :⊤,
before(dominique,naren) :⊤, . . . , before(dominique, pascal) :⊤, . . .
before(pascal,dominique) :⊤, . . . , before(pascal,philippe) :⊤}.
There is a single most consistency-preferred model as expected. The puzzle, as stated, has no
inconsistent information so we show only the has_position-facts.
m = {has_position(ignace,1) : t, has_position(dominique,2) : t,
has_position(pascal,3) : t, has_position(philippe,4) : t,
has_position(olivier,5) : t, has_position(naren,6) : t}.
In addition, there are many before-facts which encode the sequential order of arrival of the
runners.
Next, we illustrate several cases of injection of inconsistency into the puzzle. Since complete
models tend to be rather large, we show only the has_position- and ⊤-predicates.
12 Pascal arrives in the sixth position — Variation 1
has_position(pascal,6) : t.
There is one model and it contains inconsistencies:
m = {has_position(ignace,1) : t, has_position(dominique,2) : t,
has_position(naren,3) : t, has_position(philippe,4) : t,
has_position(olivier,5) : t, has_position(pascal,6) : t,
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before(pascal,naren) :⊤, before(pascal,olivier) :⊤}.
The before-facts still represent the sequential order of arrival, so before(pascal,naren) : t and
before(pascal,olivier) : t are true in the model. However, Sentence 12 contradicts these facts,
so before(pascal,naren) : f and before(pascal,olivier) : f are also true. Therefore, these facts
become inconsistent. Sentence 10 does not imply any inconsistencies beyond the ones already
mentioned.
13 Ignace arrives in the second position. — Variation 2
has_position(ignace,2) : t.
There is one model:
m = {has_position(dominique,1) : t, has_position(ignace,2) :⊤,
has_position(pascal,3) : t, has_position(philippe,4) : t,
has_position(olivier,5) : t, has_position(naren,6) : t}.
Given that Sentence 13 contradicts Sentence 9, the fact has_position(ignace,2) becomes in-
consistent and the order of arrival of Dominique and Ignace are swapped.
14 Philippe arrives before Dominique. — Variation 3
before(philippe,dominique) : t.
Now, we get 4 models:
m1 = {has_position(ignace,1) : t, has_position(dominique,2) : t,
has_position(pascal,3) : t, has_position(philippe,4) : t,
has_position(olivier,5) : t, has_position(naren,6) : t,
before(philippe,dominique) :⊤}.
m2 = {has_position(philippe,1) : t, has_position(dominique,2) : t,
has_position(pascal,3) : t, has_position(ignace,4) :⊤,
has_position(olivier,5) : t, has_position(naren,6) : t}.
m3 = {has_position(philippe,1) : t, has_position(dominique,2) : t,
has_position(pascal,3) : t, has_position(olivier,4) : t,
has_position(ignace,5) : t, has_position(naren,6) : t,
before(ignace,olivier) :⊤}.
m4 = {has_position(philippe,1) : t, has_position(dominique,2) : t,
has_position(naren,3) : t, has_position(pascal,4) : t,
has_position(ignace,5) : t, has_position(olivier,6) :⊤,
before(pascal,naren) :⊤, before(ignace,naren) :⊤}.
The first model generates the same solution as the original puzzle except for the inconsistency
where Philippe arrives before Dominique. The second model places Ignace in the fourth position,
which contradicts Sentence 11, so placing Ignace in the fourth position becomes inconsistent.
The third model places Olivier before Ignace, which is in contradiction with Sentence 6. All the
other constraints are satisfied, so no more inconsistencies are derived. The fourth model places
Naren before Pascal and Ignace, which contradicts Sentence 6. Besides, it places Olivier the last,
which contradicts Sentence 4.
